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Abstract
The paper examines the various usages of the Attic particle μήν and proposes a unified
analysis of itsmain function. I argue that the prevalent analysis of Wakker (1997) needs
some important reconsideration when instances of μήν in Platonic dialogue are con-
cerned. First, the particle can target not only the propositional content of a discourse
act, but also its illocution (felicity conditions). Second, I propose ‘countering expec-
tations or assumptions of the addressee’ as the basic value of the particle. Functions
in terms of commitment are better seen as secondary side effects. Third, I argue that
differences in the origin of the countered assumptions or expectations are a natural
basis for distinguishing between attitudinal μήν (extra-linguistic context and/or previ-
ous words of the addressee) and discourse connective μήν (previous words of the same
speaker). It follows from my analysis that strict categorical boundaries between these
usages are not to be expected.
Keywords
μήν – attitudinal particles – discourse connective particles – contrast – intersubjectiv-
ity – polysemy
* This paper is an extended and updated version of the contribution I submitted for the volume
of proceedings of the international conference on Ancient Greek linguistics in Rome (23–
27 March 2015). It is based on my talk at that conference as well as one I gave at the biennial
Dutch conference on Greek and Latin linguistics in Katwijk (20–21 November 2015). I would
like to thank the participants of both conferences for their comments, and especially Gerry
Wakker for preparing a response in Katwijk. I would also like to thank Corien Bary, Markus
Egg, the members of the Amsterdamse Hellenistenclub and two anonymous reviewers for
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1 Introduction
It is a well-known cross-linguistic fact that discourse particles typically occur
in many different contexts and in various kinds of speech acts. As such, they
characteristically display a broad array of different usages, which makes a
unified descriptive account of their meaning or function into an interesting
puzzle. This situation is no different for the Attic particle μήν, the topic of
the present paper. To give a first impression of the diversity of the different
contexts inwhich μήν occurs, consider the following typical examples and their
English translations. All examples are taken from the dialogues of Plato, the
main research corpus of the present paper.1
(1) [Then Agathon said, “It turns out, Socrates, I didn’t know what I was
talking about in that speech.”]
—Καὶ μὴν καλῶς γε εἶπες, φάναι, ὦ Ἀγάθων. (Pl. Smp. 201b–c)
“It was a beautiful speech, anyway (μήν), Agathon,” said Socrates.
(2) [“You’re not quite getting my meaning,” said I.]
—Ποῖα μήν, ἔφη, λέγεις; (Pl. r. 523b)
“Then (μήν) what do you mean?” he said.
(3) [“Someone who opines opines some one thing?”—“Yes.”]
—Ἀλλὰ μὴν (a) μὴ ὄν γε οὐχ ἕν τι ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ὀρθότατ’ ἂν προσαγορεύοιτο;
—Πάνυ γε.
—Μὴ ὄντι μὴν (b) ἄγνοιαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπέδομεν, ὄντι δὲ γνῶσιν;
—Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη. (Pl. r. 478c)
“But surely (μήν) the most accurate word for that which is not isn’t ‘one
thing’ but ‘nothing’?”—“Certainly.”—“But (μήν) we had to set ignorance
over what is not and knowledge over what is?”—“That’s right.”
valuable comments on earlier drafts of the paper. The research for this paper is supported by
the eu under fp7, erc Starting Grant 338421–perspective.
1 The Greek is that of themost recent oct-editions. The English translations are—if not noted
otherwise—those of the volume edited by Cooper (1997). Within these translations I have
added bracketed μήν behind the expression that seems to be the rendering of μήν. If no such
expression seems to be present, bracketed μήν is placed at the beginning of the particular
discourse unit.
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(4) [her. Tell us your story, Critias.—cri. Yes, we really should, if our third
partner, Timaeus, also agrees.]
ti. Δοκεῖ μήν (a).
kp. Ἄκουε δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, λόγου μάλα μὲν ἀτόπου, παντάπασί γε μὴν (b)
ἀληθοῦς, … (Pl. Ti. 20d)
tim. Of course (μήν) I do.—cri. Let me tell you this story then, Socrates.
It’s a very strange one, but (μήν) even so, every word of it is true.
(5) [ath. … After these remarks, our law (νόμος) on the subject should run
like this: description of the law, about 16 oct-lines.]
δεύτερος μὴν νόμος· … (Pl. Leg. 919d–920a)
Now (μήν) for a second law: …
Two important observations can already be made on the distribution of μήν.
First, we find the particle both in discourse acts that express an assertion, as in
(1), (4a) and (5), and in discourse acts that have a non-assertive illocution, such
as the specifying question in (2) and the yes/no-questions in (3). Second, μήν
can occur both at the beginning of a new speech turn, the previous words being
spoken by a different speaker (turn-initial use of μήν, as in examples (1)–(4a)),
as well as somewhere within a speech turn, the previous words being spoken
by the same speaker (turn-internal use of μήν). In the latter case, μήν can occur
either more globally at the beginning of a new discourse move, as in (5), or
more locally within such a move, as in (4b).2
These distributional facts, which seem to allow for distinguishing different
usages of μήν, make a unified descriptive account of the particle a complex
puzzle.Why dowe find one and the same particle in somany different contexts
2 I will use the concepts of ‘move’ and ‘discourse act’ here as developed in the work of, for
instance, Kroon (1995) and Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2008). A move is defined by the latter
as “an autonomous contribution in ongoing interaction”, its most important characteristic
being that “it either is, or opens up the possibility of, a reaction” (2008:50). Most typically, a
move coincides with a speech turn in conversation. In argumentative and narrative genres,
however, a speech turn may also be more complex, consisting of multiple (linearly or hierar-
chically) ordered moves. Typically then, a move corresponds to a paragraph or an episode. A
discourse act is definedbyKroon (1995:65) as “the smallest unit of communicative behaviour”,
which unlike a move does “not necessarily further the communication in terms of approach-
ing a conversational goal.” Amove consists of at least one act, but typically consists of multiple
(linearly or hierarchically) ordered acts. Crucially, it is the discourse act—which does not
need to coincide with the traditional clause or sentence—that serves as the basic linguistic
unit in the analysis of discourse particles. Cf. Mosegaard Hansen (1998; 2006); Pons Bordería
(2006) andWaltereit (2006) on this.
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(with quite different English translations)? First, we would like to see that,
within a unified account, all of the facts mentioned are explained in a natural
way. Second, we also want to explain how the various different usages of the
particle are interrelated either on a synchronic or a diachronic level.
In my view, the currently prevailing accounts of μήν in Classical Greek,
notably those of Denniston (1954) andWakker (1997), are not fully able to deal
with these two issues and account for all of the distributional observations
made above. I discuss their analyses as well as their shortcomings in section
2. In sections 3 and 4, I propose a revisited unified account of the particle and
examine in detail its most typical usages, focusing on instances in Platonic
dialogues.
I believe that the Platonic corpus is indispensable when examining the
function of μήν, because it is one of our main sources of Greek dialogue,
the text type in which μήν is found most frequently. In addition, the Platonic
dialogues—especially the later ones—also consist of considerable stretches of
argumentative monologue, in which one speaker holds the floor and unfolds a
particular argument, but an addressee is still present in the discourse situation.
As has been recognised earlier, μήν is also found in this particular text type.3
Furthermore, as far as I know, the function of μήν in Plato has not been the
object of a detailed study since Denniston’s (1954) important handbook. These
two facts certainly make the present study a desideratum.4
3 This is based on the work of George (2009), who gives ample discussion of the degree of
‘dialogicity’ of particles in relation to text type (with pp. 158–164 more specifically on μήν).
He clearly demonstrates that μήν can also occur in monological texts with a high degree
of ‘diaphony’, i.e., passages where an addressee is implicitly ‘present’ in the text. George
points out that it is telling that in a narrative work like that of Thucydides—where an
addressee/narratee is at the background most of the time—μήν occurs only 19 times in
total. Moreover, they only occur in stretches of (in)direct speech or in evaluative passages
where Thucydides addresses “his more explicitly personal observations about the history he
is writing” (2009:163), i.e., in passages with a high degree of diaphony. Similar conclusions
are presented by Cuypers (2005) on μάν/μήν in Homeric narrative. It would be interesting
to see whether the same conclusions can be reached with respect to the narrative works of
Xenophon, where we also find an overt narrator that frequently intervenes in the narrative
and μήν occurs more frequently than in Thucydides (26× in the Anabasis and even 70× in the
Hellenica). I leave this to further research (see also fn. 57 below).
4 Sicking (1993:51–55), in a short appendix to his study on particle use in Lysias, does discuss a
few examples of μήν in Plato, but his observations on the particle do not seem to be based on
a fully-fledged and detailed study of the particle in this author.
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2 Previous literature on μήν
Denniston (1954), as the culmination of the preceding tradition of particle
research, distinguishes three distinct uses of μήν: (i) emphatic, (ii) adversa-
tive connecting and (iii) progressive connecting.5 On emphatic μήν Denniston
gives littlemore semantic information than that “it is difficult to grasp the exact
difference in sense between μήν and the far commoner δή” (330). Adversative
connecting μήν is explained byDenniston as ‘balancing’ in nature, i.e., connect-
ing two coexisting, but opposed facts. English ‘yet’ and ‘however’ are proposed
as apt translations of this use. Finally, progressive connecting μήν “either adds
a fresh point (‘again’, ‘further’), or marks a fresh stage in the march of thought
(‘well’, ‘now’)” (336).When used solitarily (i.e. not in collocationwith other par-
ticles), progressive μήν is almost completely confined to the Platonic corpus.
Although this categorisation gives an extremely useful overview of a large
part of the data, Denniston is less clear and convincing when it comes to the
exact semantico-pragmatic function(s) of μήν, as well as the interrelationship
between these three widely divergent uses. In particular, his discussion—
or rather lack of discussion—of the semantics of emphatic μήν gives rise to
problems in this respect.6
These issues are addressed in Wakker’s (1996; 1997) account of μάν/μήν,
which is based upon the functionally oriented discourse-pragmatic framework
that Kroon (1995) has developed for the description of Latin particles. As her
research corpus she uses the dialogues of Theocritus (1996) and tragedy (1997).7
I believe that her account is a huge step in the right direction, but it still needs
some important reconsideration. This is particularly due to the fact that some
usages of the particle do not occur—or only very infrequently—inher research
corpora. My readjustments concern twomain topics: (i) the basic semantics of
the particle, and (ii) the connective usages of the particle.
(i) Wakker’s most important observation is that Denniston’s emphatic μήν
belongs to the class of attitudinal or modal particles.8 This group crucially
5 The adversative and progressive categories also appear in Denniston’s discussion of the
collocations ἀλλὰμήν (1954:341–347), γε μήν (347–350) andκαὶ μήν (351–358),which are treated
separately as distinct and fixed particle combinations—for which I see no need. See section
5 for a more detailed discussion of the notion of connectivity.
6 For the same points of criticism, see e.g. Wakker (1996:247–249; 1997:209–210).
7 Theocritus (3rd century bc) wrote in the Doric dialect and correspondingly used μάν instead
of μήν.
8 For Ancient Greek, I would prefer the term ‘attitudinal’ particles to ‘modal’ particles in order
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reflects the fact that an utterance is always part of a particular communicative
situation with two or more discourse participants, i.e., speaker and hearer(s).
The particles in this class specify the speaker’s attitudewith regard to (the truth
value of) the expressed information or the supposed knowledge, expectations
andpresuppositions of his hearer(s).Wakker generally analyses μήν as amarker
of speaker commitment, giving the following definition:
In using μήν the speaker expresses his positive commitment to the truth
of the proposition; he indicates that he as it were personally guarantees
its truth: ‘in truth’, ‘really’. This insisting on the truth of the proposition is
not a mere sign of ‘emphasis’, rather the speaker in this way anticipates a
possible reaction of disbelief on the part of the addressee.
wakker 1997:213
The latter part of this description involves the supposed beliefs and expec-
tations of the addressee: the speaker assumes that the addressee might not
expect his proposition to be true. This expectation, Wakker argues, can be
based upon information in the previous conversation or upon the speech sit-
uation in general.9 Example (6), in which Tiresias rejects (the implications of)
the previous words of Creon, clearly illustrates the proposed analysis of μήν as
marking personal insistence on the truth of the proposition and anticipation
of possible disbelief or counter-expectation.
(6) κρ. οὐ βούλομαι τὸν μάντιν ἀντειπεῖν κακῶς.
τε. καὶ μὴν λέγεις, ψευδῆ με θεσπίζειν λέγων. (s. Ant. 1053–1054)
cre. I do not wish to reply rudely to the prophet.—tir. And truly (μήν)
youdo speak rudely, saying thatmyprophecies are false. (translation from
Wakker 1997: ex. 21)
to avoid confusion with particles like ἄν, which are also modal but in a totally different way,
having a close relationship with the verbal category of mood.
9 Wakker’s analysis overlaps with Sicking’s view on μήν. He argues that “[w]ith μήν … the
speaker shows himself aware that his audience may not be inclined to accept the statement,
and indicates that he will nevertheless uphold it. It thus implies the possibility of a distance
between the two” (1993:52, italics original). Further on he adds that “[t]he particle μήν seems
to be at home in expressing the contrary of what the person addressed might either (1)
suppose or (2) wish” (54). Sicking’s view is also followed by Cuypers (2005), who examines
μάν/μήν in the epic genre (Homer and Apollonius).
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On the basis of this semantico-pragmatic description Wakker is able to
explain some striking distributional properties of μήν, viz. that μήν has a strong
tendency to occur (i) in the dialogical text type10 and (ii) in declarative clauses,
i.e., in assertions.
Now, this second point constitutes my main objection. Wakker focuses on
μήν in discourse acts that express assertions and correspondingly takes μήν as
targeting theproposition.However,wehave seen that inPlatoμήν alsooccurs in
acts with a non-assertive nature, e.g. in interrogatives (cf. (2) and (3) above) or
directives as in the following example (note the imperative σκόπει ‘take care’):11
(7) Καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, Σκόπει μήν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅπως μὴ ἔξαρνος ἔσει ἃ νῦν
λέγεις. (Pl. Euthd. 283c)
And Dionysodoros said: “(μήν) Take care, Socrates, that you don’t find
yourself denying these words.”
Since specifying questions and directives are typically understood as not
expressing full propositions, Wakker’s analysis runs into trouble here. Since
there is no proposition present, the speaker cannot express his commitment to
its truth value.12 Thus, it seems that the particle in these instances does not per-
tain to the propositional content of the discourse act in question, but rather to
(aspects of) its illocution. Furthermore, in yes/no-questions, which ask for con-
firmation, it seems to be at least out of place that a speaker strongly commits
himself to the questioned proposition. These distributional facts entail that
commitment to, or insistence upon, propositional truth cannot be the right
concept for a unified description of μήν’s basic semantics.
Furthermore, in some instances a reading in terms of personal commitment
to the truth of the proposition may be possible technically, but does not nat-
urally harmonise with particular contextual clues. One such a clue is the co-
occurrence of μήν with expressions that indicate the speaker’s doubt or uncer-
tainty, i.e., lack of full commitment to the truth of the proposition expressed.
10 See fn. 3.
11 As noted by Denniston (1954:331–332), we already find μήν/μάν in wishes and directives
in Homeric epic (e.g. Il. 1.302, 5.765, 7.459). For the few directive examples in tragedy, cf.
Wakker (1997: fn. 13). Other Platonic examples of μήν in directives are: with imperative Plt.
263b, Leg. 644d, 699d; with hortatory subjunctive Plt. 297d and Leg. 842a.
12 A related speech-act issue is the occurrence of μήν in utterances with a first-person
performative verb, e.g., Leg. 810e λέγω μὴν ὅτι ‘I state that’ or Ep. 347c ἀξιῶ μήν ‘I request
to’. Though perhaps not impossible, it seems at least unnatural that a speaker explicitly
commits himself to the information that he performs a particular speech act.
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Clear examples of such expressions are epistemic verbs like ἔοικε ‘it seems that’
or οἶμαι ‘I think/surmise’13 and the attitudinal particle που, which is found now
and then in direct collocation with μήν, as in the following example:14
(8) [Hippias argues that the ordinary people—who aren’t knowing (εἰδότες)—
would probably not agree with Socrates that the lawgivers without the good
will also miss the lawful and the law.]
σω. Ἀλλὰ μήν που οἵ γ᾿ εἰδότες τὸ ὠφελιμώτερον τοῦ ἀνωφελεστέρου νομιμώ-
τερον ἡγοῦνται τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις· ἢ οὐ συγχωρεῖς;
ιπ. Ναί, συγχωρῶ, ὅτι γε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ. (Pl. Hp.Ma. 284e)
soc. (μήν) But (ἀλλά) I suppose (που) people who know, at least, believe
that what is more beneficial is more lawful in truth for all men. Or don’t
you agree?—hipp. Yes, I grant that it’s that way in truth.
Here, by using που (‘I suppose’), Socrates indicates that he is not fully com-
mitted to the information he provides—or at least he presents it in this way,
leaving room for possible disagreement on the part of Hippias. If we take μήν
as amarker of speaker commitment to propositional truth, the collocationwith
such expressions of uncertainty seems to be out of place.
Finally, a more theoretical argument may be adduced in addition. Even if
one would argue that the notion of personal speaker commitment in itself
could still be saved—viz. on the assumption that it essentially targets illocu-
tionary acts rather thanpropositional content15—the general usefulness of this
concept in ascribing a basic semantic value to μήν (or any other attitudinal par-
ticle) is rather questionable, at least if it is not defined more exactly in terms
of e.g. epistemic certainty, evidentiality, speaker’s belief or common ground.
13 See for instance example (10) below.
14 See e.g. Sicking (1993:59) on που: “with που a speaker presents his statement as a surmise
whose accuracy he does not vouch for so that disputing it need not impair the basis for
an understanding between the two partners in the conversation.” Sicking also shows that
που can be used to mark potentially face-threatening acts, i.e., as a marker of politeness
on the part of the speaker. He argues that this analysis fits the question-based character of
Platonic dialogue, which, in turn, explains the high frequency of που in Plato (as opposed
to e.g. tragic dialogue or oratory). I do not agree with Koier’s (2013) recent analysis of
που as primarily a marker of obvious or accessible information. In my view, this lacks the
important conversational aspect of Sicking’s analysis.
15 This was suggested by one of my anonymous reviewers. Cf. also Kroon’s (1995) descrip-
tion of Latin vero. Note, by the way, that the collocation of μήν with που would still be
problematic on this account.
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Wakker unfortunately, never explains in detail how she understands ‘commit-
ment’ and what it means in her analysis, apart from the intuitive conception
we all have about it. Inmy opinion, this results in a rather abstract, unspecified
linguistic notion, which can easily be applied to all kinds of different contexts.
Theoretically, this does not seem to be very satisfactory. In case of assertions,
for instance, the question arises what is it exactly that μήν conventionally ‘adds’
to the ‘basic’ commitment or speaker belief that is typically taken to be present
in every assertion as a prerequisite for a cooperative way of communication—
as reflected in, for instance, the sincerity condition for assertions in speech act
theory: ‘s believes p’ (Searle 1969), and the Gricean maxim of quality: ‘Try to
make your contribution one that is true’ (Grice 1975). In other words, to what
extent would an utterance containing μήν differ in speaker commitment from
the sameutterancewithout μήν? I believe that the real difference between such
utterances lies not so much in (a higher degree of) speaker commitment, but
should rather be sought within the domain of interpersonal relations between
speaker and hearer. In other words, I think it is better to focus on the aspect of
counter-expectation.
(ii) My second point of reconsideration concerns the discourse connective
usages of μήν. Whereas Wakker convincingly shows that μήν develops a pro-
gressive discourse connective use,16 she strongly doubts the existence of an
adversative connective use. She does concede that for many instances of μήν
an adversative nuance is present, as in (6) above or in the following exam-
ple:
(9) οὐκ οἶδ’ ἀκριβῶς· εἰκάσαι γε μὴν πάρα. (e. Rh. 284)
I don’t knowcertainly; it is, to be sure (μήν), possible to divine. (translation
fromWakker 1997: ex. 22)
16 Wakker explains that in enumerations and climactic contexts μήν can be used to “mark an
itemof which the speakermay expect that itwill elicit the addressee’s disbelief or surprise.
Anticipating a reaction of disbelief he marks the truth of what he is presenting with μήν”
(1997:226). From here,Wakker argues that μήν acquires a progressive nuance, introducing
a new point in the discourse—which the addressee probably did not expect—or a sud-
den turn in the course of events. So the attitudinal value is not wholly lost in this type of
instance. However, elsewhereWakker (1996:257–259) argues that in the 3rd-centuryGreek
of Theocritus the development to a progressive connective particle has been fully com-
pleted, since here examples can be found where the attitudinal value of μήν (inWakker’s
view, speaker commitment and anticipation of disbelief, see above) is completely absent.
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But then she argues that
[it] seems unwarranted… to ascribe in these cases an adversative connect-
ing function to μήν. The adversativity results from the fact that contrasting
assertions aremade and does not as such belong to themeaning of μήν. …
Otherwise stated, μήν does not itself express the adversative relationship,
but by its very meaning it is very much compatible with such a context.
wakker 1997:224–225, italics original
Thus, Wakker concludes, in tragedy the particle never loses its primary attitu-
dinal value and must never be taken “as just an adversative connector” (226).
In the Platonic data however, we findwhat I call the μέν-μήν-pattern, uttered by
one and the same speaker, which can be taken as important evidence for rec-
ognizing such an adversative connective use (paceWakker).17 Here is a typical
example (cf. also (4b) above):
(10) Καλὸν μὲν ἡ ἀλήθεια, ὦ ξένε, καὶ μόνιμον· ἔοικε μὴν οὐ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι πείθειν. (Pl.
Leg. 663e)
Truth is a fine thing, Stranger, and it is sure toprevail, but (μήν) topersuade
men of it seems no easy task.
Here too, to be sure, the adversative relation between the two discourse acts
would already have been present without the particles, i.e., due to the context
and the content of the two acts. As such, it is rather hard to definitely prove that
μήν is an adversative connective here.18 However, μήν occurs here in reaction to
the ‘preparatory’ discourse connective particle μέν, i.e., in the same position in
17 Wakker (1996:255–257) also discusses the μέν-μήν-pattern in Theocritus. Here, she main-
tains that μήν never loses its main attitudinal value of commitment, but she admits that
the particle might have developed an additional adversative connective function in this
pattern. In my view, as argued in this section, this connective feature is already present in
(late) classical Greek.
18 I thank one of my anonymous reviewers for this important caveat. We are dealing here
with the notorious difficulty of assessing whether a meaning aspect (in this case adver-
sative connection) is part of the coded or conventional meaning of the particle itself
or part of the contextual meaning (as a side-effect of the particle). However, it has also
been shown cross-linguistically that on a diachronic level such contextual meanings or
frequently occurring side-effects tend to become part of the conventional meaning of
the particle itself (cf. Traugott & Dasher (2002:34f.) on the Invited Inferencing Theory of
Semantic Change). This seems to be the case for μήν too (cf. also section 5 on diachronic
change and Allan forthc.).
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which we typically find other discourse connective particles like δέ (a marker
of thematic discontinuity) or ἀλλά ‘but’.19 This fact gives us a rather strong indi-
cation, in my view, that in this pattern μήν should be regarded not as strictly
attitudinal in nature (expressing counter-expectation), but also as connective
in a discourse-structural sense, just as the two other particles. Additional sup-
port for this view is the conspicuous absence—in the entire body of Classical
Greek literature—of the collocation of μήν with δέ.20 If μήν were to be strictly
attitudinal in nature, collocation with the attitudinally neutral connective δέ
theoretically would not be impossible. However, the distributional evidence
shows that μήν behaves as a competitor of δέ in instances like these.21
In view of these facts then, I am strongly inclined (following Denniston) to
regard μήν as an adversative discourse connective particle in these instances:
it indicates a contrastive coherence relation between two discourse units of
the same speaker (denial-of-expectation contrast, see section 4). In sections
4 and 5 I will examine the differences between the attitudinal and discourse
connective usages as well as issues of categorisation in more detail.
To sum up, the reasons for reconsideration are twofold. First, the notion of
commitment to the truth of the proposition as part of μήν’s basic semantics
cannot be aligned with all of the available Platonic data, either because of
its occurrence in non-assertive speech acts or because of other incompatible
clues in the context. Second, in Plato there is strong evidence that μήν has an
additional use as a discourse connective particle of an adversative nature.
In order to deal with these issues, I propose that (i) Wakker’s secondary
aspect of μήν’s basic value—countering supposed expectations or assumptions
of the addressee—constitutes the primary meaning aspect coded by μήν; (ii)
commitment or affirmation is a secondary element and is at best seen as
a pragmatic side-effect in particular contexts (i.e. assertions). In table 1, the
19 Cf. Bakker (1993) for an analysis of the particle δέ and the μέν-δέ-pattern in Ancient Greek.
20 There is only one example where δέ and μήν take the same postpositive position: Pl.
Leg. 782c Τὸ δὲ μὴν θύειν … There are a few other instances, but these all have variae
lectiones without δέ. For this reason, it is probably justified to doubt this instance as well,
as Denniston (1954:341) already proposes.
21 Another interesting distributional fact is that it is only within the μέν-μήν-pattern that μήν
is found in complements that are embedded under verbs of speech or thought, as in Leg.
860e: ἄκοντας μὲν ἀδίκους εἶναί φησιν, ἀδικεῖν μὴν ἑκόντας πολλούς ‘he states (φησιν) that μέν
there are those who are unjust against their will, but (μήν) that many men do commit
unjust acts voluntarily.’ Cf. also Leg. 723a, r. 529e and Sph. 216b. This might be taken as
further evidence that μήν in this pattern behaves differently from the strictly attitudinal
usages and has an additional discourse connective feature.
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table 1 Differences between Denniston’s, Wakker’s and my own account of μήν.
Denniston Wakker Thijs
Basic value – speaker commitment
(insistence on
propositional truth +
counter-expectation)
countering expecta-
tions or assumptions
(pointing at a possible
alternative view)
Usages emphatic attitudinal attitudinal
adversative connecting
contrastive discourse
progressive connecting progressive discourse
particle
connective particle
main differences between my proposal and those of Denniston and Wakker
are shown. In the remainder of the paper, I discuss my own proposal in more
detail. First, I discuss the notion of counter-expectation or contrast in general
(section 3); second, I review and exemplify the various different usages of μήν,
both the attitudinal and the discourse-connective ones (section 4). I end with
some theoretical remarks on the categorization of μήν (section 5).
3 Intersubjective coordination and contrast
A useful way of looking at the concepts of counter-expectation and contrast
in general is the cognitive-linguistic notion of intersubjective coordination as
used by Verhagen (2005; 2015).
Verhagen assumes that every linguistic utterance involves not only an objec-
tive content level, but also a subjective level, which comprises (at least) two
conceptualisers, i.e., the speaker and the addressee(s), as well as the mutu-
ally shared knowledge between them: their common ground.22 The common
ground comprises (i) knowledge of the present communicative event, both
22 In the functional discourse approach of Kroon (1995)—followed by Wakker (1997)—the
objective level is termed ‘representational level’. Verhagen’s ‘subjective’ level of linguis-
tic utterances is very much compatible with the other two levels distinguished by Kroon:
the ‘presentational level’, which deals with the textual structuring of a discourse and the
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physically and linguistically (the preceding discourse), (ii) the common per-
sonal history of the interlocutors and (iii) general culturally-oriented knowl-
edge about (regularities in) the world, which includes shared cultural models
of nationality, ethnicity, religion etc., particular cognitive schemata, frames and
generalized topoi23 (of the form: ‘normally if x, then y’ or ‘generally, x because
of y’).24
Crucially, the conceptualisers may well entertain different perspectives or
points of view (i.e. knowledge states, assumptions, expectations etc.) with
regard to a particular object of conceptualisation. Consequently, negotiation
must take place as to whether a particular piece of information is agreed upon
and accepted as being part of the common ground. Moreover, a speaker needs
to manage the coordination between the perspectives sufficiently in order to
produce utterances that the addressee can interpret felicitously at a given
point within a conversation. The relationship between the conceptualisers’
perspectives is called intersubjective coordination.
Now, one of the main tenets of Verhagen’s work is that the conventional
meaning of manynatural language expressions and grammatical constructions
(e.g. sentence negation, complementation constructions or discourse connec-
tives) should be placed not only on the objective level, where it would be
described in terms of truth-conditional representation of the world, but rather
on the subjective level of speaker and hearer. Of course, both attitudinal and
discourse connective markers are good examples of this type of expression:
they have no truth-conditional or referential meaning and are typically seen as
either expressions of speaker attitude or stance (subjective use) or as instruc-
tions from speaker to hearer on how the information within an utterance
should be integrated within the common ground between them in a coherent
way (intersubjective use).25
marking of rhetorical coherence relations between discourse units, as well as the ‘inter-
actional level’, where interpersonal relations and the evaluation of information within
discourseunits have a central place. Cf. alsoAijmer&Simon-Vandenbergen (2004), Foolen
(2006) andWhite (2003) on the importance of the concepts of ‘heteroglossia’ and ‘engage-
ment’ in linguistic analysis. These concepts reflect “the ways in which speakers position
themselves vis-à-vis other, real or imagined, voices. Bakhtin’s notion of heteroglossia is
thus evoked to account for the fact that linguistic choices reflect either speakers’ explicit
recognition or denial of the existence of other, possibly divergent discourse” (Aijmer &
Simon-Vandenbergen (2004:1784)).
23 This term originates from the influential theory on argumentativity in language by
Anscombre & Ducrot (1983), which Verhagen’s work is strongly influenced by.
24 See also Clark (1996: ch. 4), on which Verhagen’s (2015) account is based.
25 See for instance the definition given by Mosegaard Hansen (2006:25): “The role of mark-
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In view of this framework and Wakker’s earlier analysis, I propose to anal-
yse μήν as an intersubjective particle that is at work in the management of the
intersubjective coordination between the perspectives of speaker and address-
ee(s).26 I take it that a speaker using μήν links the information within its host
unit with the assumptions, attitudes or expectations that are assumed to be
present in the perspective of the addressee(s). Crucially, these are taken to be
not in complete coordination with—typically opposite to—those of the speaker.
This means that μήν is involved in the negotiation of whether particular infor-
mation is agreed upon and accepted as being common ground information or
not. It signals a discrepancy in the individual sets of assumptions or expecta-
tionsof each interlocutor at themomentof utterance.On this account, contrast
or adversativity ispart of μήν’s basic semanticmeaning (paceWakker): it always
reacts to and points at an alternative view or perspective. In other words, the
contrast is of an intersubjective nature.
Thus, by using μήν the speaker indicates that he counters the supposed
expectations or assumptions of his addressee(s). An apt paraphrase of μήν is
‘unlike what you may expect or assume now’.27 The divergent expectations or
assumptionsmay involve the objective (propositional) content that is commu-
nicated in the discourse, but—crucially—also the felicity of the speech acts
ers, in my view, is to provide instructions to the hearer on how to integrate their host
utterance into a developing mental model of the discourse in such a way as to make
that utterance optimally coherent.” Or Bazzanella (2006:456): “Discourse markers are
items external to propositional content which are useful in locating the utterance in an
interpersonal and interactive dimension, in connecting and structuring phrasal, inter-
phrasal and extra-phrasal elements in discourse, and in marking some on-going cogni-
tive processes and attitudes.” See also section 5 on the categorisation of discourse mark-
ers.
26 Other attitudinal particles, e.g. Greek ἦ, only indicate the speaker’s stance or epistemic
certainty with respect to an object of conceptualisation, i.e., these particles are subjective
in nature. Cf. the terminology of Cuypers (2005), who consistently distinguishes between
speaker-oriented and addressee-oriented attitudinal particles.
27 Note that I have excluded Wakker’s term ‘anticipation of possible disbelief ’ from my
description, since this term seems to presuppose that μήν only occurs in assertive speech
acts, which is not the case, as we have seen. The present analysis also neatly explains
the observed high frequency of μήν in reaction to and collocation with sentential nega-
tion (e.g. Wakker (1997:219)). As is explained by for instance Verhagen (2005), sentential
negation also works on the level of intersubjective coordination, rather than only on the
objective content level. It contradicts an alternative view, which is assumed to be (possi-
bly) entertained by the addressee or someone else. It might not come as a surprise then
to find μήν and negation in each other’s vicinity quite frequently.
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made in the given discourse context as well as the proper and cooperative con-
tinuation of this discourse. In the next section, I examine in more detail how
both the attitudinal and the discourse connective usages of μήν could comply
with this general description.
4 The different usages of μήν
I have proposed that μήν always indicates a discrepancy in perspectives, i.e.,
points to a possible alternative view of the addressee. Now, to look ahead a
bit, I believe that the variation in the origin of this alternative view is a natural
basis for explaining the different usages of the particle. In short, if the alter-
native view originates from either the extra-linguistic discourse situation (e.g.
common ground information) or the previous words of the addressee (turn-
initial use), μήν is characteristically purely attitudinal in nature (section 4.1). If,
on the other hand, this alternative view is evoked by the previous words of the
speaker himself (turn-internal use), μήν has an additional discourse connective
function, indicating an adversative or contrastive coherence relation between
two discourse units of one and the same speaker (section 4.2).
4.1 Attitudinal μήν
Wehave seen in section 2 that attitudinal μήν occurs in various kinds of speech
acts. Consequently, it does not always relate to the propositional content of the
discourse act that is μήν’s host unit, but rather to aspects of its illocution. This
is in line with the way the group of modal or attitudinal particles in Germanic
languages are typically analysed. Waltereit & Detges (2007:78), for instance,
state that they involve answering the question “What do I believe that you
believe concerning the felicity of my speech act?” In this way, modal particles
are a means to modify the felicity conditions, and particularly the preparatory
conditions, of a particular speech act.28 It might be helpful at this point to look
briefly at two examples of contrastivemodal particles in Dutch and German as
discussed by Foolen (2006):
28 Waltereit (2001:1414): “Their purpose is essentially to accommodate at minimal linguistic
expense the preparatory conditions of the speech act they occur in.” Cf. also Foolen
(2006:66–68) and Egg (2013) for analyses of Dutch and German modal particles in terms
of felicity conditions à la Searle (1969).
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(11) a. Imperative (directive):
d. Ach, hou toch op met dat gezeur,
g. Ach, hör doch endlich damit auf.
Oh, stop nagging, for goodness’ sake! (= Foolen 2006: ex. 11)
b. Declarative (assertion):
d. Maar ik kan toch thuis koffie zetten.
g. Aber ich kann doch zu Hause Kaffee machen.
e. But I can make coffee at home, can’t I? (= Foolen 2006: ex. 12)
As Foolen explains, in (11a) the particle toch/doch targets a preparatory condi-
tion of a directive speech act, viz. that the addressee does not know that the
speaker wants him to do something. The contrastive toch/doch signals that this
usual condition does not hold for the present speech act, i.e., that (the speaker
assumes that) the addressee does know that the speaker wants him to do this
(for instance, because the request has beenmade earlier). The result is that the
request has an indulgent character. In (11b), a preparatory condition of asser-
tions is targeted, viz. that the addressee does not already know the information
conveyed by the speaker. Again, the particle signals that this usual condition is
cancelled: the speaker assumes that the addressee did know this information.
Thus, Foolen points out, utterances like these function as a check: the speaker
checks whether the addressee has indeed taken this information for granted.29
It is interesting to see whether a similar analysis in terms of felicity condi-
tions can be helpful for a description of attitudinal μήν, at least when it occurs
in non-assertive speech acts. In the following, I discuss attitudinal μήν in (i)
assertions, (ii) directives, (iii) specifying questions and (iv) yes/no-questions.
(i) In assertions,30 attitudinal μήν can accompany propositional information
that has a surprising, unexpected, unprecedentedor abnormal character—that
is, in view of general extra-textual knowledge about regularities in the world. I
give one example:31
29 It is interesting that in Dutch it has even become common to use ‘checking’ toch also in
an iconic way at the end of Dutch utterances (like tag-questions or the colloquial ‘right?’
in English).
30 The present account of μήν in assertions is in line with most of Wakker’s (1997) actual
analyses of examples in tragedy. Cf. also Kroon’s (1995: ch. 11) analysis of Latin vero.
31 The translations in sections 4 and 5 are modified as far as the rendering of μήν is con-
cerned. In English—a language that lacks the group of attitudinal particles—μήν can
often be felicitously rendered by means of the contrastive adverb yet and/or by stressing
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(12) [Echecrates and Phaedo talk about Socrates’ last day in prison and his
death.]
εχ. … ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ὡς ἂν δύνῃ ἀκριβέστατα διεξελθεῖν πάντα.
φα. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε θαυμάσια ἔπαθον παραγενόμενος. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς θανάτῳ
παρόντα με ἀνδρὸς ἐπιτηδείου ἔλεος εἰσῄει· (Pl. Ph. 58e)
echecr. … But try to tell us every detail as exactly as you can.—phaed.
And unlike what youmay expect (μήν) I had strange emotions when I was
there. For I was not filled with pity as I might naturally be when present
at the death of a friend.
Here, the function of μήν can be analysed as signalling that the proposition that
Phaedo had strange emotions (θαυμάσια) comes as unexpected for Echecrates.
This is based on the general regularity (present in the cultural common ground
of the interlocutors) that one typically is filled with pity when a friend dies,
as is explicitly spelled out in the following γάρ-act. Thus, μήν signals a discrep-
ancy between the presented information and some general knowledge that is
assumed to be present in the cultural common ground (and thus also enter-
tained by the addressee).
More typically however, μήν is more closely tied up with the reasoning in
the preceding conversation, as it points at an (argumentative) implication
or conclusion that has somehow arisen out of the preceding words of the
addressee (i.e. a combination of extra-linguistic and linguistic context; see
section 5). Here are two examples:
(1’) [Then Agathon said, “It turns out, Socrates, I didn’t know what I was
talking about in that speech.”]
Καὶ μὴν καλῶς γε εἶπες, φάναι, ὦ Ἀγάθων. (Pl. Smp. 201b–c)
“And yet (μήν) you did speak beautifully, Agathon,” said Socrates.
(13) ξε. Ἦ χαλεπὸν ἐνδείξασθαι πρᾶγμα ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα γέγονεν, ὡς φαίνεται.
νε.σω. Πάντως γε μὴν ῥητέον. (Pl. Plt. 306a)
vis.What it seemswe have to deal with, in that case, is certainly a difficult
thing to show.—y.soc. Yet (μήν) by all means (πάντως) we do have to
discuss it.
the verb with a polar do-construction. This also holds for (6) above: ‘and yet, you do speak
rudely.’ InDutch, which does have attitudinal particles, the particleswel or toch seem to be
good candidates, as these particles also involve a denial of some negation or an assumed
negative view (cf. Hogeweg (2009) and Foolen (2006) respectively).
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In (1’), Agathon says that he knew nothing of what he was talking about.
From this utterance Socrates infers that Agathon might assume now that he
has not spoken καλῶς ‘beautifully’ either.32 This however, is not in accordance
with Socrates’ own view, which warrants the use of μήν in Socrates’ following
utterance: ‘and unlike what you (might) think now, you did speak καλῶς’. In (13),
the Visitor’s rather cautious statement—notice ὡς φαίνεται ‘as it seems’—that
the explanation needed is difficult, makes Young Socrates draw the conclusion
that theVisitorwill not give the explanation at all. This is in contrast to Socrates’
own view and μήν is used to signal this.33
Attitudinal μήν also occurs in what seem to be confirmative assertions, indi-
cating agreement or compliance on the part of the speaker.34 In most of these
cases, this discourse act is a reaction to utterances that display some degree
of what Kroon (1995: ch. 11) has called challengeability, viz. utterances contain-
ing expressions that clearly indicate a lack of full certainty or leave room for
possible disagreement or non-compliance (i.e. an alternative view). Examples
of challengeable utterances are suggestions, cautious statements and yes/no-
questions.
(4a’) [her. Tell us your story, Critias.]
kr. Ταῦτα χρὴ δρᾶν, εἰ καὶ τῷ τρίτῳ κοινωνῷ Τιμαίῳ συνδοκεῖ.
ti. Δοκεῖ μήν. (Pl. Ti. 20d)
cri.Yes,we really should, if our thirdpartner,Timaeus, also agrees.—tim.
I do (μήν) agree.
(14) αθ. … εἴρηται δ᾿ ἡμῖν, οἶμαι, καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν.
κλ. Τί μήν;
αθ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν σκοπώμεθα μόνον, … (Pl. Leg. 707d)
ath.…But I thinkwe’ve already taken this line before.—clin.What else?
(μήν) [= Of course.]—ath. Then we need consider only one thing: …
32 This inference is particularly appropriate in the context of the present dialogue (Sympo-
sium), in which it is the relation between knowledge and beauty that is at stake continu-
ally.
33 These two examples of μήν are very much related to the discourse-connective use dis-
cussed below (section 4.2.1). See also section 5 and especially fn. 67 below.
34 This use is called the ‘assentient’ use of ἀλλὰ μήν and καὶ μήν by Denniston (1954:342–344,
353), but asWakker (1997) and van Erp Taalman Kip (2009) have already pointed out, the
countering of expectations or assumptions of the addressee is at stake in these instances
as well.
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(15) αθ. Ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα, εἴπερ ψυχὴ περιάγει πάντα, ἆρ᾿ οὐ
καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον;
κλ. Τί μήν;
αθ. Περὶ ἑνὸς δὴ ποιησώμεθα λόγους, … (Pl. Leg. 898d)
—ath. If, in principle, soul drives round the sun, moon and the other
heavenly bodies, does it not impel each individually?—clin. What else?
(μήν) [= Of course.]—ath. Let’s take a single example then: .…
Good examples of expressions that occur in suggestions or cautious statements
are hypothetical conditionalswith εἰ ‘if ’, as in (4a’),35 the attitudinal particle που
and epistemic verbs like οἶμαι ‘I think/surmise’, as in (14). In (4a’), the εἰ-clause
implies Critias’ lack of full certainty and inherently leaves room for the pos-
sibility of a negative answer on Timaeus’ part. In Timaeus’ view however, the
approval for further discussion was already implicitly given and, correspond-
ingly, should not have been questioned by Critias.36 In other words, there is a
discrepancy in perspectives and this allows the use of μήν in Timaeus’ confir-
mative act. A similar analysis can be given for (14), where we find the elliptical
rhetorical question τί μήν; used as a confirmative assertion (i.e. as an indirect
speech act).37 Finally, yes/no-questions in Plato characteristically elicit a pre-
ferred reaction of agreement or confirmation (note ἆρ᾿ οὐ ‘isn’t it the case that’
in (15)): but the very fact that the speaker uses a yes/no-question—to which
inherently both ‘yes’ and ‘no’ are possible answers—points out that an opposite
view might also be possible, i.e., that the speaker is not (yet) certain whether
his addressee is ‘on the same page’ as he. Thus, it does not need to surprise us
that we find μήν also in reaction to yes/no-questions.
(ii) In case of imperatives, theparticle pertains to the illocutionof thediscourse
act and could be described in terms of modifying felicity conditions (as exem-
plified above). I repeat example (7) here with some more context:
(7’) [This gaveme the idea that theymust have thoughtwewere joking earlier
…When this idea occurred to me, I insisted all the more that we were in
dead earnest.]
35 Denniston (1954:343–344, 353) also has a category for μήν “substantiating a condition”.
36 In speech act-theoretical terms, we could argue that μήν signals here that (in Timaeus’
view) the preparatory condition of his assertion (i.e. that Critias does not know the
information conveyed) does not hold.
37 The exact linguistic analysis of τί μήν; is an interesting topic but goes beyond the scope of
the present paper.
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Καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, Σκόπει μήν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅπως μὴ ἔξαρνος ἔσει ἃ νῦν
λέγεις.
Ἔσκεμμαι, ἦν δ᾿ ἐγώ· οὐ γὰρ μή ποτ᾿ ἔξαρνος γένωμαι. (Pl. Euthd. 283c)
And Dionysodoros said: “Yet (μήν) do take care, Socrates, that you don’t
find yourself denying these words.”—“I have given thought to thematter,”
I said. “For I shall never come to deny them.”
Here, μήν can be analysed as cancelling the preparatory condition according
to which the addressee (Socrates) does not know that the speaker (Dionyso-
doros) wants him to take care of something. As such, he assumes that Socrates
does already know that he should not deny his own words. The fact that
Dionysodoros still needs to make this request—in his view Socrates is already
contradicting himself—gives it a rather indulgent character. This analysis cor-
roborates, in turn, the indulgent and uncooperative character of the sophist
Dionysodorus as portrayed by Plato in the Euthydemus.38
(iii) In (2) abovewe have seen that μήν occurs in standard specifying questions,
i.e., questions that can only be interpreted as genuine requests for further
information. This use is not found in tragedy and comedy, but in Plato and
Xenophon I found a considerable number of instances (28 in total). Here is
another example:
(16) [Diotima unfolds her thoughts about Love: “This is the source of the great
excitement about beauty that comes to anyone who is pregnant and
already teeming with life: beauty releases them from their great pain.]
ἔστιν γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ὁ ἔρως, ὡς σὺ οἴει.
Ἀλλὰ τί μήν;
Τῆς γεννήσεως καὶ τοῦ τόκου ἐν τῷ καλῷ. (Pl. Smp. 206d–e)
You see, Socrates,” she said, “what Love wants is not beauty, as you think
it is.”—“But (ἀλλά) what does (μήν) it want?”—“Reproduction and birth in
beauty.”
38 Alternatively, μήν could cancel the ability condition of a request: (the speaker assumes
that) the addressee is able todowhat is requested.Thiswould result in a ratherprovocative
utterance, where Dionysodorus implies that Socrates is unable to remain consistent (‘Go
ahead and see that you don’t contradict yourself ’). See also Il. 1.302 for a nice example
of this type, spoken by an angry Achilles. Cf. Egg’s (2013:135–136) view on the German
utterance Verklag mich doch (‘Go ahead and sue me’), which implies that the addressee
won’t succeed anyway.
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Now, it is quite conspicuous that all of the instances of μήν in specifying
questions are found in very similar discourse contexts. Themain characteristic
is that the μήν-question is typically preceded by an utterance of the addressee
(speaker b), in which a possible assumption of the speaker of the μήν-question
(a) is rejected.39Note the use of sentential negation οὐ and the explicit ὡς σὺ οἴει
‘as you think’ in (16). Then, after this rejection, speaker a uses a specifying μήν-
question to ask which assumption should replace the rejected one, i.e., which
assumption should be added to the common ground.
An analysis of μήν in these contexts seems to involve Gricean reasoning
on cooperative communication (Grice (1975)). Since speaker b only rejects
an assumption of speaker a and does not explicitly state which information
should be added to the common ground in its place, his utterance is not very
informative—the maxim of quantity is violated—and thus not very coopera-
tive. On the basis of the cooperative principle—a regularity present in the cul-
tural common ground between the speakers—speaker b is expected to unfold
his own view on the matter now, but he does not comply with this implicit
cooperative principle. Thus, speaker A needs to explicitly request him to do so
(with the μήν-question). There is a discrepancy in views on the cooperative and
proper continuation of the conversation here and it is μήν that signals this.40
Note that, again, the alternative view arises out of the previous words of the
addressee. This time, however, it involves inferences and assumptions about
cooperativeness and informativeness in conversation (the Gricean maxim of
quantity specifically).
In speech-act theoretic terms, we could say that μήν signals the cancellation
of a preparatory condition of a request again, viz. that (the speaker assumes
that) the addressee does not know that the speakerwants him to do something,
in this case providing particular information.With μήν the speaker signals that
he assumes that his hearerdoes already knowor should have known this (based
on common ground information about cooperative behaviour in discourse).
The fact that he nevertheless has to ask the question gives the utterance a bit
of an indulgent character.
(iv) In Plato, μήν also occurs quite frequently in moves that seem to be yes/no-
questions or rising declaratives, as in (3’).41 Typically, such elicitingmoves with
39 See also Denniston (1954:333) and Rijksbaron (2007:143) for this observation.
40 The absence or presence of ἀλλά in these utterances might have something to do with
the question whether the information (i.e. the rejection) in the previous utterance is
immediately accepted by speaker a, as seems to be the case in (2), but not in (16).
41 An important qualification on the status of yes/no-questions is appropriate here. In
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μήν prefer a reaction of agreement, being premises for a particular conclusion
(note consequential ἄρα here):42
(3’) [“Doesn’t someone who opines set his opinion over something? Or is it
possible to opine, yet to opine nothing?”—“It’s impossible.”—“But some-
one who opines opines some one thing?”—“Yes.”]
Ἀλλὰ μὴν (a) μὴ ὄν γε οὐχ ἕν τι ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ὀρθότατ’ ἂν προσαγορεύοιτο;
Πάνυ γε.
Μὴ ὄντι μὴν (b) ἄγνοιαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπέδομεν, ὄντι δὲ γνῶσιν;
Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.
Οὐκ ἄρα ὂν οὐδὲ μὴ ὂν δοξάζει;
Οὐ γάρ. (Pl. r. 478c)
“But surely (μήν) the most accurate word for that which is not isn’t ‘one
thing’ but ‘nothing’?”—“Certainly.”—“Surely (μήν), we had to set igno-
ranceoverwhat is not andknowledgeoverwhat is?”—“That’s right.”—“So
someone opines neither what is nor what is not?”—“No, you’re right.”
As argued in section 2 above, it is unnatural to analyse μήν here in terms of (a
high degree of) speaker commitment to the truth of the proposition expressed
by the question. But is an analysis in terms of countering expectations and
assumptions of the addressee possible here? After all, in the present context
there are no clues that the propositional content presented in the discourse
act with μήν is in contrast with the view of the addressee (Glaucon): rather,
Glaucon continually confirms the reasoning by Socrates.
Ancient Greek, these can be indisputably marked as such by means of introductory
question-particles like ἆρα, ἆρ’ οὐ (cf. (15) above) and οὐκοῦν or juxtaposed illocutionary
expressions like εἰπέ μοι ‘tell me’ or ἀποκρίνου ‘answer (me)’ (cf. Shalev 2001). However,
when such indicators are not present; the difference between a yes/no-question (a rising
declarative) and an assertion cannot be made on formal grounds in the text, but only on
interpretation of the surrounding context. Thus we need to keep in mind that, in these
cases, it depends only on editor’s choice whether a period or a question mark is printed
in a particular text edition (cf. Sicking (1997) on editorial issues like these). At any rate,
utterances as exemplified in (3’)—which are, of course, very typical of the inquisitive
character of Platonic dialogue—clearly elicit a response (preferably agreement) from the
addressee; as such, they do not seem to be regular assertions.
42 Denniston (1954:337, 344, 351–352) already makes the observation that μήν occurs fre-
quently in premises of an argument in Plato. He assigns the progressive connecting func-
tion to the particle in these contexts (but cf. my section 5 below for some qualifications
on the alleged connection here). Cf. van Ophuijsen (1993) for the use of ἄρα in Plato.
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Again, I think an analysis in terms of felicity conditions can be helpful here.
I propose that μήν cancels the preparatory conditions of assertions here,43 i.e.,
that (the speaker assumes that) the addressee does not know the information
conveyed.Thiswould yield the checking functionmentionedabovewith regard
to toch/doch.44 In other words, Socrates assumes that Glaucon already knows
the information presented in these moves. And indeed, this information is
of a very trivial nature (‘not existing is best called nothing’ in (3’a)) or has
already been agreed upon earlier in the dialogue (note the phrase ἐξ ἀνάγκης
ἀπέδομεν ‘we have by necessity assigned’ in (3’b)). So with μήν the speaker
checks whether the addressee indeed agrees with him on some very trivial
(common ground) information. The reason then for making such an utterance
is that the addresseemight not actively entertain the information at thepresent
point in the conversation. However, this information is relevant as a logical
step towards a particular conclusion and needs to get activated and confirmed
first.
A similar analysis can be given for the following example:
(17) [ath. … You appreciate that each and every assembly and gathering for
any purpose whatever should invariably have a leader (ἄρχοντα)?—clin.
Of course.]
αθ. Καὶ μὴν (a) ἐλέγομεν νυνδὴ μαχομένων ὡς ἀνδρεῖον δεῖ τὸν ἄρχοντ’ εἶναι.
κλ. Πῶς δ᾿ οὔ;
αθ. Ὁ μὴν (b) ἀνδρεῖος τῶν δειλῶν ὑπὸ φόβων ἧττον τεθορύβηται.
κλ. Καὶ τοῦτο οὕτως. (Pl. Leg. 640a–b)
ath. Andwe did (μήν) say amoment ago that if it is a case of men fighting,
their leader must be brave?—clin. Yes, indeed.—ath. Surely (μήν), a
brave man is less thrown off balance by fears than cowards are?—clin.
That too is true enough.
Here too, the μήν-utterances are building up toward a particular conclusion and
seem tobeused to activate particular trivial information from the cultural com-
mon ground, which the addressee might not be aware of at this point in the
conversation.Wemight say that the speaker is checkingwhether the addressee
is aware of the relevant inferences that can be made from the previous state-
ment on the basis of general knowledge about theworld: a leader implies being
43 Note that we are still dealing with a declarative sentence type here. See fn. 41.
44 The English adverb surely (see the given translations) can also have this checking function
(Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer (2007:34–44)).
96 thijs
Journal of Greek Linguistics 17 (2017) 73–112
brave—here it is checked whether Clinias is still aware of the fact that they
accepted this a little earlier (ἐλέγομεν νυνδή ‘we just now said’)—and a brave
leader, in turn, implies not being easily thrown off balance by fears.
In general, I believe that this analysis of ‘checking’ μήν can be aligned very
well with the inquisitive character of the Platonic dialogue. The printing of the
question marks in example (3)—i.e. an interpretation as a yes/no-question or
a rising declarative—corroborates my interpretation of μήν and, as far as I am
concerned, this is a good thing to do in example (17) too.45
Now, if this analysis is correct, we can also explain why μήν in this particular
use can occur in collocation with attitudinal που, as in example (8) in section
2 above. I think που has its typical function here: indicating lack of full speaker
commitment to the expressed information as to leave room for possible dis-
agreement on the part of the addressee—note also ἢ οὐ συγχωρεῖς; ‘or don’t
you agree?’—and to imply a degree of politeness on the part of the speaker.46
Μήν, on the other hand, signals that this information, trivial as it might be, is
as yet not activated by the addressee and not taken into account at the present
moment in the conversation, most typically because it is in some kind of con-
trast with the view of the addressee as laid out in the preceding discourse. In
other words, μήν targets the illocution here and has a checking function, while
που is used to tone down the force of the utterance and save the addressee’s
face.47
To sum up, I believe that the notion of countering expectations or assump-
tions is present in all instances of attitudinal μήν. It always indicates a (pre-
sumed) discrepancy between the assumptions of the speaker and the ad-
dressee, either with respect to the propositional content of the discourse act
in question or with regard to its illocutionary force and felicity as such. The
possibility of a discrepancy typically arises out of the previous discourse con-
text (spoken by the addressee) in combinationwith extra-linguistic knowledge
about regularities in the world (including communicative patterns).
Now, in view of a unified analysis of the particle, it might even be attractive
to argue that all instances of attitudinal μήν, even when they occur in assertive
45 At least an editor should be consequent, as Sicking (1997) has convincingly argued. Cf. also
fn. 41.
46 See fn. 14 on the function of που.
47 This is very much in line with the one comment that Sicking (1993:60) has on the colloca-
tion of μήν που (at Grg. 477e): “μήν intimates that a denial from Polus [the addressee, kt]
would destroy any chance of an agreement, and που … allows Polus to save his face while
losing his stake.”
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speech acts, target the illocution, rather than the propositional content.48 This
would be possible for (1), (4a) and (13) for instance. However, there are also
instances where it seems to be only the propositional content of the discourse
act that is relevant for μήν’s analysis, e.g. (12). As such, it seems better to allow
variability in the linguistic entities that μήν can target.
4.2 Discourse-connective μήν
I believe that discourse-connective μήν can also be analysed in terms of coun-
tering expectations or assumptions, but has an additional structural function:
it marks contrastive coherence relations between two discourse units spoken
by one and the same speaker and thus connects these units (also in a more
structural way, see section 5). It indicates either what in the literature is often
called a denial-of-expectation contrast (4.2.1) or a more global discourse con-
trast (4.2.2). The former is reminiscent of Denniston’s ‘adversative connecting
μήν’, whereas the latter covers his ‘progressive connecting μήν’.
4.2.1 Denial-of-expectation contrast
A denial-of-expectation contrast typically consists of three elements.49 First,
there is a contextual issue, the topic under discussion. Second, there is a conces-
sion, the information contributed by the first part of the contrastive pair. This
contains a partial answer to a contextual question and a confirmation of some
information. Thirdly, there is the correction, the information contributed by the
second part. The correction initiates a search process for conflicting implica-
tions, which is typically an implication of the first conjunct, interpreted with
48 Additional support for this view would be the distributional fact that μήν never occurs
in subordinate adverbial clauses expressing a proposition—e.g. temporal, conditional or
relative clauses—whereas other Greek particles that are typically taken as belonging to
the group of attitudinal particles, e.g. που and δή, do occur in these environments. But
admittedly, to come up with conclusive evidence in this matter is quite difficult in a dead
language.
49 This section is based upon the very similar analyses of e.g. Anscombre & Ducrot (1977;
1983), Kroon (1995: ch. 9), Verhagen (2005: especially ch. 2 and 4) and also the more
formal work of Spenader &Maier (2009). Cf. Allan forthc. with respect to Ancient Greek.
I believe discourse connective μήν behaves very similar to μέντοι in Lysias and Herodotus
as described by Sicking (1993:33–35) and Slings (1997) respectively. This should not come
as a surprise in view of the etymological relations between these two particles, μέντοι
being a combination of original μήν and τοι (‘I tell/assure you’, developed from the second
person dative pronoun). My analysis would also be in line with that of Oréal (1997)
on μήν in Demosthenes’ speeches. She compares μήν with the French discourse marker
‘pourtant’.
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respect to the issue. Thus, it involves the denial of an implication or expecta-
tion that the addressee might infer from the first part of the contrastive pair
(i.e. a denial of an alternative view). Typically, this implication or expectation
is derived from generalised (but defeasible) topoi, which are assumed to be
present in our world knowledge, i.e., in the cultural common ground (see sec-
tion 3). The contrastive pair is used to indicate that the speaker is aware of this
topos, but that it does not hold in this particular case. An example, taken from
Spenader &Maier (2009):
(18) [Issue: Will Mary and John get married?]
Mary is in love with John, but she turned down his proposal for marriage.
Given the contextual issue in (18), the first part might be seen as evidence for
the conclusion thatMary and Johnwill getmarried, based on a topos that love is
typically a prerequisite for gettingmarried. However, this implication is denied
by means of the following but-clause. In other words, the but-clause always
cancels the argumentative load of the concessive part.
In Greek this same analysis could be given for the μέν-μήν-pattern (see sec-
tion2 above).Here thediscourse actwithμέν is the concession, theonewithμήν
the correction or denial. This means that the μήν-act denies a possible impli-
cation or expectation that is derivable from the μέν-act and related somehow
with the issue at stake. I discuss two earlier examples here:
(10’) [Ath. Suppose that the truth had been different fromwhat the argument
has now shown it to be… could a lawgiver have told amore useful lie than
this, or onemore effectivemaking everyone practice justice in everything
they do, willingly and without pressure?]
κλ. Καλὸν μὲν ἡ ἀλήθεια, ὦ ξένε, καὶ μόνιμον· ἔοικε μὴν οὐ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι πείθειν.
(Pl. Leg. 663e)
cli. (μέν) Truth is a fine thing, Stranger, and it is sure to prevail, yet/but
(μήν) to persuade men of it seems no easy task.
(4b’) Ἄκουε δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, λόγου μάλα μὲν ἀτόπου, παντάπασί γε μὴν ἀληθοῦς,
… (Pl. Ti. 20d)
Let me tell you this story then, Socrates. (μέν) It’s a very strange one,
yet/but (μήν) even so, every word of it is true.
In example (10’), there is a contextual issue of the desirability of persuading
people of something that is true. The μέν-act, the concession, confirms some
contextual information, viz. that truth is something beautiful and prevailing.
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This part is accepted into the common ground. Then the μήν-act, which con-
tributes the information that it seems difficult to persuade people of the truth
(in this particular case), corrects a possible implication of the information in
the μέν-act. The implication arises out of a topos that normally if something is
beautiful and prevailing, it would be easy to persuade people of it. The μήν-act
denies or corrects the implication that is raised by this topos. In (4b’), the infor-
mation in the μέν-act (the discourse act μάλα μὲν ἀτόπου ‘very strange’) raises
an expectation or a possible implication (in this context), which is rejected by
the μήν-act (παντάπασί γε μὴν ἀληθοῦς ‘in all respects true’). The implication is
based on a topos that normally very strange things are not regarded as (very)
true ones.
Now, I believe that the analysis given can easily be extended to instances
in which we have no preceding μέν-act, but where an analysis of denial-of-
expectation contrast fits the context very well.50 Consider (19):
(19) [vis. Now it seems that there are two routes to be seen stretching out in
the direction of the part towards which our argument has hurried, one of
them (τὴν μέν) quicker, dividing a small part off against a large one,]
τὴν δέ, ὅπερ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ μεσοτομεῖν ὡς μάλιστα, τοῦτ᾿
ἔχουσαν μᾶλλον, μακροτέραν γε μήν (a). ἔξεστιν οὖν ὁποτέραν ἂν βουληθῶμεν,
ταύτην πορευθῆναι.
νε. σω. Τί δέ; ἀμφοτέρας ἀδύνατον;
ξε. Ἅμα γ᾿, ὦ θαυμαστέ· ἐν μέρει γε μὴν (b) δῆλον ὅτι δυνατόν. (Pl. Plt. 265a–
b)
while the othermore closely observes the principlewewere talking about
earlier, that one should cut in the middle as much as possible, but/yet
(μήν) is longer. We can go down whichever of the two routes we like.—
y.soc. What? Is it impossible to follow both?—vis. By both at once it is,
you strange boy; but (μήν) clearly it is possible to take each in turn.
In (19a), μήν again scopes over an adjective that forms a separate discourse act
(μακροτέραν γε μήν). Here, the second road is first described as being more in
accord with earlier statements of the Visitor. This might lead Young Socrates
to the conclusion that this is the best path to choose. The μήν-act however,
provides a counterargument for this conclusion—the fact that this road will
be longer—and cancels it. In (19b), the first part of the Visitor’s reply most
50 This also holds for example (9) above, where I would conclude that μήν also connects the
two discourse acts (paceWakker).
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probably triggers Young Socrates to infer that it is indeed impossible to take
both ways (note also the use of the rather offensive vocative ὦ θαυμαστέ ‘you
strange boy’). However, this implication is corrected by the following discourse
act with μήν, in which the possibility of taking both paths is preserved in a
modified version.
I end this section with a nice example from a more narrative, rather than a
purely argumentative, passage, in which (assumed) expectations on the pro-
ceeding of the story are cancelled by means of μήν:51
(20) [Having emptied this great flood of words into our ears all at once like a
bath attendant, Thrasymachus intended to leave (ἐν νῷ εἶχεν ἀπιέναι):]
οὐμὴν εἴασάν γε αὐτὸν οἱ παρόντες, ἀλλ’ ἠνάγκασαν ὑπομεῖναί τε καὶ παρασχεῖν
τῶν εἰρημένων λόγον. (Pl. r. 344d)
But/yet (μήν) those present did not let him, but made him stay to give an
account of what he said.
Here, the previous discourse could create the expectation that Thrasymachus
would indeed leave; at least, this is what he plans to do—and most typically
people act in accordance with their plans (a topos in the common ground).
However, this possible expectation is denied in the next discourse unit, which
has μήν.52
4.2.2 Global discourse contrast
Μήν also seems to have a function on a more global level of discourse, viz.
marking relations between communicative moves rather than discourse acts
within amove.Thus, it seems to involve “the negotiation of coherence and joint
coordination of interaction: what arewe going to do next?” (Waltereit &Detges
(2007:78)). In other words, we could say that μήν in this use is not so much
involved in indicating relations between the objective content of discourse
51 Cf. example (26) in Wakker (1997). Note that we are dealing with a narrative spoken by
Socrates here. Although there are no other interlocutors in the Republic, I think it is safe to
assume that his addressees are still very much present, since we are dealing with a spoken
narrative here. Cf. fn. 3 on the notion of diaphony and for some figures on μήν in narrative
texts.
52 Note also that after the denial, a corrective ἀλλά follows which introduces the things that
did happen, i.e., the things that should replace the denied alternative view. I believe that
from instances like these (οὐ μήν … ἀλλά …) the particles have become grammaticalised
into the fixed contrastive combination οὐ μὴν ἀλλά (cf. Denniston (1954:28–30)). Cf. also
fn. 18 above and section 5 on diachronic change.
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units (as in the examples in section4.2.1). Rather, it pertains to expectations and
assumptions about the argumentative or thematic structure of the discourse
itself.53 I repeat (5) here as a typical example:
(5’) [ath. … After these remarks, our law (νόμος) on the subject should run
like this: description of the law, about 16 oct-lines.]
δεύτερος μὴν νόμος· … (Pl. Leg. 919d–920a)
But/yet (μήν) there is second law: …
Here it seems to be the case that μήν just marks a next move in the discourse,
signalling a discourse boundary and a transition to a following (sub-)topic (like
δέ also does). This function is called ‘discourse contrast’ by Kroon (1995).54 One
might conclude then that the notion of countering expectations or assump-
tions is not or no longer present in this use.55
However, in accordance withWakker’s (1997:226–229) ideas on the progres-
sive connectiveuse, I believeμήν typically doesmore than signalling adiscourse
boundary. In (5’), it signals that the addressee probably did not expect this
next step at this point: since the first law has been introduced as a singular
law (νόμος) and takes a considerable amount of space, the addressee might
draw the conclusion that this law suffices. However, a second law is needed
as well.
Here is another example:
(21) [The Athenian tells the story of the Greek defeat of the Persians. Meg. Yes,
sir, you are quite right, and your remarks reflect credit both on your
country and yourself.—Ath. No doubt, Megillus; and it is only right and
proper to tell you of the history of that period, seeing that you’ve been
blessed with your ancestors’ character.]
ἐπισκόπει μὴν καὶ σὺ καὶ Κλεινίας εἴ τι πρὸς τὴν νομοθεσίαν προσήκοντα
λέγομεν· οὐ γὰρ μύθων ἕνεκα διεξέρχομαι, οὗ λέγω δ’ ἕνεκα. (Pl. Leg. 699d)
53 This is reminiscent of a distinction made by Slings (1997) in his description of the dis-
course connective μέντοι in Herodotus. In the terminology of Kroon (1995) and Wakker
(1997), this function of μήν would be on the presentational level of discourse; cf. fn. 22 and
section 5 below.
54 Cf. the view of van Erp Taalman Kip (2009), who uses the notion of ‘shift in the focus
of attention’ to describe some usages of καὶ μήν. Cf. also Allan forthc. on discourse-
contrastive μήν.
55 Cf. fns. 57 and 66 as well as section 5 on the possibility of the diachronic development of
a semantically bleached discourse function.
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But (μήν) consider, both you and Clinias, whether these remarks of ours
have any relevance at all to legislation. After all, this is the object of the
exercise—I’m not going through all this simply for the story.
In (21), we also find μήν at the start of a new step or move within a speech turn.
Whereas the first part of this turn constitutes a reaction to the previous turn
of Megillus, the second part, starting with μήν, shifts the focus of attention to a
new point about the story just told, viz. its purpose for the present discussion.
We can add that this move of the Stranger might be somewhat unexpected for
Megillus and Clinias at this point in the conversation.56
I conclude that, as far as Plato is concerned, even the discourse-contrastive
use of μήν seems to indicate a possible discrepancy between two perspec-
tives, countering the possible expectations or assumptions of the addressee.
Consequently, I think the progressive use should not be seen as a completely
separate function or category. The use is somewhat different from the others,
however, as it is oriented towards assumptions about the thematic and argu-
mentative structure of a complex move. It signals that a next related issue or
topic might not (yet) have been cognitively activated in the common ground
between speaker and hearer, but is relevant for the complete discussion of the
current, more general theme. Thus, μήν is also of importance for the thematic
organisation within argumentative discourse.57
56 In my view, ἀλλά could have been used here as well to indicate a discourse contrast (cf.
Slings (1997) andAllan forthc.). Thedifference to μήν seems tobe that ἀλλά ismore strongly
corrective or replacing in character, i.e., it replaces the preceding discourse topic as being
completely unimportant or irrelevant. This connotation does not necessarily need to be
conveyed by μήν. Some other clear examples of discourse-contrastive μήν are Leg. 729d,
778b, 828a; Phdr. 224b.
57 This conclusion is in line with observations on the collocation γε μήν by Revuelta Puig-
dollers (2009:106–109) and George (2009:166). The former, however, also discusses exam-
ples from Xenophon’s Hellenica, i.e., from a narrative text (see fn. 3 above): I leave it to
future research to examinewhether there is evidence inXenophon too formaintaining the
original attitudinal value of μήν (countering expectations/assumptions of the addressee)
in the discourse-contrastive examples, or that the particle has definitely developed a
semantically bleached, i.e. attitudinally neutral, discourse function only (similar to δέ);
cf. section 5 and fn. 66. I do not think that γε μήν should be seen as a fixed combination
of particles, since γε may also occur later on in the μήν-utterance (cf. examples (1) and
(3a) above). In other words, γε—a demarcating scope particle functioning at the level of
information structure (cf. Wakker 1994:308f.)—and μήν might sometimes just end up in
the same postpositive position. In my view, it does not come as a surprise that a parti-
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5 Some qualifications concerning categorisation
Since μήν executes both strictly attitudinal and discourse connective functions,
it is an interesting case studywith respect to the issue of particle categorisation.
I will make some remarks here about the categorisation of the different usages
of μήν and similar particles, which in my view should allow flexibility. I will
also relate my data to questions about connectivity and diachronic change of
particle meanings or functions.
First, it is important to note that, very generally speaking, both attitudinal
and discourse-connective particles have a relational function.58 Their function
is always concerned with integrating or situating their host unit into a wider
context, linking two elements with each other. In this sense, all of these prag-
matic or discourse markers may be said to be ‘connective’, albeit in a very loose
way. Thus they are all cohesion devices, contributing to the coherence in a
mental or cognitive representation of a particular discourse.59 However, as has
been recognised bymany scholars, thesemarkers typically pertain to particular
functional domains: someexecute epistemic,modal or interpersonal functions,
relating their host units to the extra-linguistic context of the interlocutors’
perspectives, stance, (common) knowledge and cognitive reasoning processes,
whereas others execute primarily presentational, metatextual or structuring
functions, relating their host units to (mental representations of) other dis-
course units, i.e., to linguistically evoked context.60 I take it that the subgroup
cle indicating the exact scope of a message (γε) frequently collocates with a particle that
indicates a contrast between views or perspectives (μήν): we might say that γε explicitly
points at the locus of the contrastive view.
58 In a similarway,Aijmer&Simon-Vandenbergen (2004) talk about ‘indexicality’ as a crucial
feature of pragmatic markers.
59 I follow Mosegaard Hansen (1998; 2006) here; see fn. 25 for her definition of discourse
markers. Crucially, the label ‘discourse marker’ refers to a very broad functional cate-
gory that contains non-propositional and non-truth-conditional expressions, which may
belong to various syntactic categories, e.g., adverbial expressions, prepositional phrases,
coordinators or modal particles. The group of particles, I take it, should be defined only in
formal and not in functional terms (e.g. small, monosyllabic, uninflectable words). Thus,
discourse particles are a strictly formal subgroup of discourse markers. Cf. Kroon (1995)
and Pons Bordería (2006) for similar ideas.
60 Cf. for instance the categorisation of discourse marker functions by Bazzanella (2006),
who discerns cognitive (epistemic, inferential) functions, conversational functions and
metatextual functions. The first two correspond with Kroon’s (1995) interactional level,
the third with her presentational level; see fn. 22.
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of discourse connectives ismainly concernedwith this second type of function
and are connective in a stricter, discourse-structural sense.61
Now, we have seen that μήν typically executes functions that belong to
the former group, relating discourse units to extra-linguistic assumptions of
speaker and addressee (‘the alternative view’; cf. the examples in section 4.1).
But of course, such an assumption can also be inferred from or evoked by—and
as such ismore closely related to—thepreceding linguistic context. For μήν this
is clearly the case in the discourse-connective examples given in section 4.2.1
on denial-of-expectation contrast. Therefore, I think the boundary between
marking relations to strictly extra-linguistic and to linguistic context should
not be seen as rigid, but rather as a scalar phenomenon. Consequently, the
difference between strictly attitudinal and discourse connective particles is
also of a scalar nature, which means that particles (in some of its usages)
may execute functions belonging to different functional domains at the same
time.62
Such a conclusion, I believe, is especially relevant for languages that do
not feature specific syntactic criteria that delineate a separate formal class
of attitudinal particles such as in the Germanic languages. When we look at
Dutch toch for instance, we can easily tell the difference between the modal or
attitudinal use and the discourse-connective use:63
(22) a. Maar ik kan toch thuis koffie zetten.
But I can make coffee at home, can’t I? (= Foolen 2006: ex. 12)
b. Toch zou ik daarmee nog maar even wachten.
And yet, I would wait a bit before doing so. (= Foolen 2006: ex. 9)
61 Thus, I understand discourse connectives in a strict sense—as defined by e.g. Fraser
(1998; 1999), who confusingly labels them ‘discourse markers’—as a functional subgroup
of the general class of discourse markers (cf. Pons Bordería (2006)). In Greek, discourse
connective particles like δέ and γάρ belong to this class, as well as the coordinators καί
and ἀλλά when they connect discourse acts or moves. See also George (2009:164–169) for
the issue of connectivity in relation to Greek particles.
62 Cf. van Ophuijsen (1993:79), Sicking (1993:45), Kroon (1995:63–64) for a similar idea. It is
also in line with the work of Schoonjans (2013) in which he argues that in view of the
categorisationof modal particles anddiscoursemarkers it is best tomakeuse of thenotion
of categorical prototypes. This means that some particles may be a prototypical instance
of a particular class, but others reside more at the periphery of a class and may even have
typical features of more than one class.
63 See Foolen (2006) for an analysis of these data.
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As a modal particle, as in (22a), toch is unstressed and occurs in the so-
called ‘middle field’ of the sentence, two defining characteristics of modal
particles in Dutch (and German), whereas toch as an adversative discourse-
connective, as in (22b), is stressed and occurs in the sentence-initial position.
For Ancient Greek—as far as we can possibly know—criteria like these are
absent: both discourse-connective particles and attitudinal particles occur in
the left periphery of discourse units, either at the initial prepositive position
(e.g. connective ἀλλά or καί and attitudinal ἦ) or as unstressed postpositives in
‘second’ position (e.g. connective γάρ or δέ and attitudinal μήν or τοι). Given
these considerations, it does not seem to be appropriate to maintain a very
strict division between the classes of attitudinal and discourse-connective
particles in Ancient Greek.64 This conclusion pertains all themore to μήν, since
it can combine attitudinal functions with discourse connective ones in some
of its usages.
Additional support for this conclusion involves regularities in diachronic
change. Cross-linguistically, function words such as particles are known to
be prone to easily undergoing formal (phonological) or functional change:
over time, a form might acquire new additional meanings or extend its basic
meaning into new linguistic contexts, so that a polysemous picture arises.65 In
my view, this is what has happened with μήν too: whereas the basic meaning of
μήν (countering expectations or assumptions of the addressee) remains quite
stable over time, I take it that this meaning gradually extends its application
to new contexts. More specifically, the discourse-connective use, where μήν
behaves as a competitor of the more frequent δέ, is clearly a later extension
of the purely attitudinal use. The μέν-μήν-pattern, for instance, is not found in
early Greek and the earliest instances are found in Euripides, Aristophanes and
64 See Diewald (2013) for the argument that questions of categorisation of and subdivision
between attitudinal and discourse connective particles should be entirely a language-
specific issue. She argues that it has been generally accepted that almost every language
has connective items and consequently there seems to be a language-universal class of
(discourse) connectives, which is based on functional (onomasiological) criteria. How-
ever, attitudinal particles are language-specific and are typically defined as a natural word
class on the basis of strictly formal (semasiological) criteria.
65 This is the reason why, in my view, a polysemic—rather than a purely monosemic—
approach to the description of these words is a priorimost promising. See Fischer (2006b)
for discussion of the two approaches. See Mosegaard Hansen (1998), Foolen (2006), Wal-
tereit (2006) and Waltereit & Detges (2007) for good examples of polysemous particle
studies. For Ancient Greek, cf. Koier (2013) on που and most recently Allan forthc. on the
development of various contrastive discourse particles. Allan’s view on μήν is similar to
mine.
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more frequently in Plato. Thus, it seems safe to conclude that these are (late)
Classical Greek extensions of the original attitudinal use of the particle.66 This
also means that a rigid boundary is not to be expected.
With these considerations in mind, I would like to look in more detail at a
group of instances that seem to be ambiguous in view of categorisation, viz.
the instances of turn-initial μήν in eliciting moves (see also section (iv) in 4.1
above). First, consider (23):
(23) —οὐκοῦν ἓν μὲν οὐκ ἔσται τἆλλα.
—πῶς γάρ;
—οὐδὲ μὴν πολλά γε· ἐν γὰρ πολλοῖς οὖσιν ἐνείη ἂν καὶ ἕν. (Pl. Prm. 165e)
“(μέν) Well, the others won’t be one?”—“Obviously not.”—“But/yet (μήν)
they won’t be many either, since oneness would also be present in things
that are many.”
In this example, the previous move of Parmenides has μέν. As such, it seems
as if we have a μέν-μήν-pattern here—indicating denial-of-expectation con-
trast, see section 4.2.1—that surpasses the boundaries of speech turns. The
addressee, Aristotle, has agreed with the information in the μέν-part (“the oth-
ers are not one”). From this he might draw the conclusion—based on general
knowledge—that the others will be many. However, this is not the case either,
as explained in the next turn, which has μήν. It seems safe then to state that
μήν is again used here as an adversative discourse connective, indicating a con-
trastive coherence relation between the two moves of Parmenides, which are,
however, interrupted by a signal of agreement on the part of the addressee.
In other turn-initial instances, however, such as (3’) and (15) above, such an
analysis is less straightforward. Here it might be questioned whether μήν has
66 This conclusion is very much in line with one of the important cross-linguistic regular-
ities of semantic change distinguished by Traugott & Dasher (2002): meanings tend to
evolve from the internal (objective, representational) or external (subjective) level to the
textual level of language, gradually adopting a (possibly semantically bleached) discourse-
oriented function, marking coherence relations between (larger) units of discourse or
communicative moves. Correspondingly, the scope of the meanings tends to extend from
proposition or illocution to larger stretches of discourse (cf. alsoWaltereit (2006) on this).
This seems to have happened with μήν too: in the discourse-contrastive use, a later devel-
opment, it seems to relate longer stretches of discourse (i.e.moves instead of acts). Cf. also
Traugott (1999) on counter-expectative in fact and Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer (2007)
for other examples of expressions in the semantic field of epistemic certainty that comply
to these clines, as well as fn. 18 above.
the attic particle μήν 107
Journal of Greek Linguistics 17 (2017) 73–112
discourse connective—i.e. more structurally connective—features in addition
to the attitudinal use described above. One could adduce the argument that
μήν in this use is very frequently combined with coordinators like ἀλλά, καί or
οὐδέ, so that it is most plausibly not μήν that structurally connects the units
of discourse here.67 On the other hand, it also occurs quite frequently with-
out these connectives (as in the given examples). In that case, it is on the one
hand possible to argue for asyndeton, i.e., the absence of an explicit connec-
tion device between moves within a conversational exchange.68 On the other
hand, it might very well be the case that μήν also marks structural connection
here, indicating the (thematic) coherence between the consecutive steps or
moves within the encompassing argument and—also in a structural way—
connecting these moves (like the discourse-contrastive use without interrup-
tions of the addressee; see section 4.2.2). Furthermore, recall that μήν and
discourse-connective δέ are never found in collocation in instances like these
(see section 2 above). Thus it seems that μήν, when used turn-initially in elic-
iting moves, prefers to be used in collocation with a coordinator, but has also
gained discourse-connective features on its own. Again, it seems best to see it
as a scalar phenomenon.
This gives us the schematic overview in Figure 1, which represents the differ-
ent usages of μήν based on the origin of the alternative view. It might originate
from purely extra-linguistic context as in example (12) above, but most typ-
ically, as we have seen in the other examples in section 4, μήν reacts to an
implication evoked by the preceding linguistic context, which could be more
loosely related with it, or more strictly tied to a particular expression or con-
struction (e.g. an εἰ-clause or a yes/no-question). The arrow indicates that this
shouldbe seenas a scale, as explainedabove.Note that μήν is never used todeny
what is explicitly said in the previous discourse. It always targets implications
of some kind.
In my view, the more the origin of the alternative view is tied up with the
preceding linguistic context, the more μήν may be said to have an additional
discourse-connective function, both marking a contrastive coherence relation
between two discourse units and connecting these units in a structural way.
67 I would like to point out here that cross-linguistically the co-occurrence of discourse-
connective particles or adverbs and coordinators is very common, e.g., French et/mais
néanmoins, English and/but nevertheless, Dutch en/maar toch, etc. Note, however, that the
discourse particles may also occur without these coordinators. See respectively Anscom-
bre & Ducrot (1977), Foolen (2006) and Fraser (1998) for these data. Cf. also examples (1)
and (6) given above, where we have καὶ μήν.
68 See Sicking (1993:40–44) for asyndeton in Ancient Greek.
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figure 1 The different uses of μήν based on the origin of the alternative view
However, a second relevant parameter comes in here, viz. the speaker of the
previous words. This could be either the addressee or the speaker of the μήν-
unit himself. As argued in sections 2 and 4.2, I think it is safe to conclude that,
when the previous words are spoken by the same speaker, μήν is also discourse
connective in nature. However, this is less clear when the previous words are
spokenby the addressee: μήν prefers to beused in collocationwith coordinators
and is more purely attitudinal in nature. The use of μήν in eliciting moves,
however, seems to take an in-between position, as explained in the present
section.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have analysed occurrences of μήν in Platonic dialogue and
proposed some important reconsiderations toWakker’s analysis of the particle
in tragedy in order to arrive at a more generally valid description of μήν in
Classical Greek. First, I have shown that the notion of commitment to the
truth of the proposition is a problematic notion for a unified description of the
semantic value of μήν and that the cognitive notion of countering expectations
or assumptions of the addressee (i.e. indicating an alternative view of the
addressee) should take its place.This crucially involves the concept of common
ground. Second, I have shown that the origin of the contrastive alternative
view is a good basis to explain the different usages of the particle, both the
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attitudinal usages and the discourse-connective uses. The latter usages are best
seen as diachronic extensions of μήν into new contexts. Thus, whereas the
basic semantics of μήν remains stable in all of its usages, a polysemous picture
arises inwhich this basicmeaning extends to new contexts and new functional
domains. It follows that rigid categorisation of different usages is not to be
expected and would be rather artificial.
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